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(54) Method and apparatus for secure electronic voting

(57) A number-theoretic based algorithm provides for secure electronic voting. A voter may cast a votes among n centers in a manner which prevents fraud and authenticates the votes. Preprocessing allows for nearly all of the communication and computation to be performed before any voting takes place. Each center can verify that each vote has been properly counted. The invention is based on families of homomorphic encryptions which have a partial compatibility property. The invention can be realized by current-generation PCs with access to an electronic bulletin board.

n votes n centers Election Scheme

Precomputation (in the following description, i ranges over 1, ..., n, j ranges over 1, ..., m, and k ranges over the indices of all valid voters V_k)

1. The vote casters, C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n , agree on a randomly selected family of partially compatible encryption functions, E_1, E_2, \dots, E_n and post them.
2. Each voter V_i randomly chooses a "masking vote" $v_{i,j} \in \{1, -1\}$ and then randomly chooses two representations for $v_{i,j}$,

$$v_{i,j} = X_{i,j}^{(1)} + X_{i,j}^{(2)} + \dots + X_{i,j}^{(k)} = A_{i,j} + B_{i,j}.$$

The voter posts $E_1(X_{i,j}^{(1)})$, $E_2(A_{i,j})$ and $E_3(B_{i,j})$.

3. V_i executes the reduction described in conjunction with eq. (1) and obtains a single equation

$$X_1^{(1)} + X_2^{(1)} + \dots + X_k^{(1)} = A_k + B_k,$$

equality of which implies that the gives two representations of masking vote $v_{i,j}$ are equal for all j . V_i then proves the validity of the equation using prover1.

4. V_i executes protocol prove2 to show that $A_{i,j} + B_{i,j} \in \{1, -1\}$ for all j .
5. V_i encrypts $X_{i,j}^{(1)}$ using C_i 's public encryption algorithm, for all j and i , and posts the encryptions.

Vote Casting

1. To use the j th vote, voter k computes $s_{k,j} \in \{-1, 1\}$ such that his actual vote is equal to $s_{k,j} v_{i,j}$, and posts j and $s_{k,j}$. Note that often j is known and thus need not be sent. Assume that the correct j for each voter is known, and henceforth drop j from the notation.

Vote Counting

1. Each center C_i decrypts $X_{i,j}^{(1)}$ for all k and j , and verifies whether it is consistent with $E_i(X_{i,j}^{(1)})$. The center calculates the subtotal $t^{(1)} = \sum_k s_k \cdot X_{i,j}^{(1)}$ and posts $t^{(1)}$.
2. Each person checking the vote verifies that $\prod_k (E_i(X_{i,j}^{(1)}))^{s_k}$ is equal to $E_i(t^{(1)})$. If so, they accept $t^{(1)}$ as the tally of the vote.

If precomputation is not used, then s_k can be used as the actual vote and s_k is omitted.

Figure 3

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Description

The present invention relates to method and apparatus useful for secure electronic voting and specifically, to number-theoretic based algorithms for secure electronic voting. Quite specifically, the algorithms are based on families of homomorphic encryptions having a partial compatibility property.

Secure electronic voting is one of the most important single applications of secure multi-party computation. Yet despite extensive work on this subject, no complete solution has been found in either the theoretical or practical domains. Even the general solutions to secure multi-party protocols fail to exhibit all of the desired properties of elections. For example, an article by J.C. Benaloh et al, entitled "Receipt-free Secret-ballot Election," in STOC 94, pp. 544-553 (1994) describes the receipt-free property. While these general solutions do have a wide breadth of security properties, and some hope of rigorous analysis, they are impractical both in their computational and communication costs.

A number of more practical voting protocols have been proposed, with widely differing security properties. Schemes based on anonymous channels/mixers have become very popular due to their superior efficiency and the arbitrary nature of the votes that are allowed. Such schemes are described in an article by D. Chaum entitled "Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Address, and Digital Pseudonyms" in Communication of the ACM, ACM, 1981, pp 84 to 88, in an article by A. Fujioka et al, entitled "A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections." in Advances in Cryptology - Auscrypt '92, 1992, pp. 244 to 251, and in an article by C. Park et al, entitled "All/Nothing Election Scheme and Anonymous Channel" in Advances in Cryptology, Eurocrypt '93, 1993, pp. 248 to 259. However, a price is paid for this efficiency. The simplest of these schemes does not allow a voter to securely protest the omission of a vote without allowing a malicious voter to block the election. In all the schemes known to the inventors there is a high round complexity - one round for each mixer used to implement the anonymous channel. Also, after the election each voter is typically responsible for checking that their vote was correctly tallied. There is usually no way for an outside observer to later verify that the election was properly performed.

Another approach is the use of number theoretic techniques without anonymous channels or mixers. The protocol has desirable security properties, but as discussed below in detail, their communication complexity is quite high for realistic scenarios. Such techniques are described in an article by J. Benaloh and M. Yung entitled "Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters" in ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, 1986, pp. 52 to 62, in a Ph.D. thesis by J. Benaloh entitled "Verifiable Secret-Ballot Elections" Ph.D. thesis Yale University 1987 Yaleu/DCS/TR-561, and in an article by J. Cohen et al entitled "A Product and Verifiable Cryptographically Secure Election Scheme", in FOCS85, 1985, pp. 372 to 382.

The protocol of Benaloh and Yung enjoys most of the desirable security properties obtained in the present invention, and is based on partially compatible homomorphisms of the form

$$E_i(x) = y_i^x \cdot g_i^r \bmod n_i$$

The technical advances made by the present invention include:
Greater generality: The encryption used by Benaloh and Yung was tuned to the factoring problem. Each center i had the prime factorization of n_i as part of its secret information. This secret information complicated the protocol in that the voters needed to verify the correctness of the centers' public information and the correctness of their subtallies through interactive protocols. Also, the present invention can be applied to "discrete-log type" problems.

Amortization techniques: Unlike most previous work in voting, the present invention considers how to run multiple elections more efficiently. Since there are usually many voters and checking each vote involves many subchecks, amortization techniques can be effectively used to speed up single elections as well.

Improved zero-knowledge proofs: Direct and efficient protocols show, for example, that $x + y$ is either 1 or -1, without conveying which is the case. These proofs are more efficient than the cryptographic capsule methods used in the prior art.

Also, the present invention incorporates techniques, such as the Fiat-Shamir heuristic for removing interaction, that were not available at the time of Benaloh and Yung. Some of these techniques can also be applied to the original protocol (with varying degrees of difficulty and utility). By using more modern techniques the present invention realizes the basic approach laid out by Benaloh and Yung, but with greatly improved efficiency.

In accordance with the teaching of the present invention, a number-theoretic method for secure electronic voting provides a number of features including moderate communication cost, low round complexity, preprocessing potential, security, universal verifiability and flexibility, all as described below.

The idea of secure electronic voting is to enable secret votes to be performed electronically where the votes of individual voters are unknown and where the election results are tamper-proof without the collusion of many counting centers. The present invention relies upon a novel mathematical method to encode votes for verification by breaking up the vote into shares which are supplied to different counting centers. Moreover, the ballots can be pre-processed for verification, but the ultimate vote decision can be delayed until the time of actual voting. The method used permits authentication of multiple ballots efficiently. In addition, the method is readily embodied using currently available PCs or workstations and conventional electronic bulletin boards.

The present invention requires much less communication cost than the previous number-theoretic protocols. For one realistic setting of the parameters, it is estimated that present invention conservatively requires less than 1/20th the communication of Benaloh-Yung's scheme. Furthermore, when more than one election is to be held, it is possible to use an amortization technique that will boost the per-vote advantage to a factor of between 150 and 250. It should be noted however that the communication complexity of each vote remains much greater than that required by the anonymous channel/mixer-based protocols. However, it is well within the range of feasibility.

The present method enjoys an extremely low round complexity. Once the system has been set up, a voter can cast a vote in an election simply by posting a single message. The counting process comprises each counting center posting a single, very short message.

Ideally, one would like to do the bulk of the communication and computation in advance of an actual vote. In the present method, it is possible to preprocess ones vote with a single message. This preprocessing step does not depend on the vote that is eventually cast, and may be done at the time the voter "registers" to vote. When it comes time to actually vote, the voter can often simply post a single bit (or a bit along with a small integer in the worst case). Thus even with the signatures needed for identification, the communication cost is negligible. Similarly, after preprocessing, a PC acting as a voting center can easily count a hundred incoming votes per second.

Under reasonable heuristic assumptions, no coalition of voters or centers can unfairly influence an election or significantly delay its outcome. A voter keeps her vote private as long as two of the centers are honest. The two honest centers requirement can be reduced to a single honest center requirement by a simple doubling mechanism: each center simulates two centers of the original schemes.

While heuristic assumptions are used (such as the Fiat-Shamir method for noninteractive proofs) the only attack known requires one to compute discrete-logarithms over the group being worked in. Thus, it is possible to use elliptic curves for which the discrete-log problem is currently thought to be much harder than factoring. Previous number-theoretic approaches were based on the r th residue problem over Z_n^* , and are guaranteed breakable if one can factor n .

Every action by a voter, whether preprocessing a vote or actually voting, is accompanied by a proof that the ballot is correctly constructed. The output of the counting center may also be easily checked for correctness. Any participant can verify that everyone else's vote has been included in the tally. Once a party posts a message, it does not need to cooperate in the checking of its work. The checking of the election can be distributed over many parties, and if someone is still not satisfied they may check the results themselves. Thus, a voter has the option of minimally participating in an election by simply sending in their vote and then ceasing all involvement.

The present invention is readily adaptable to different situations. For example, the number of centers can be made quite large. Voters may choose their own security/efficiency tradeoff and individually choose how many and which centers they use. Thus, it is possible to practically support an election in which there are a 100 centers of which a typical voter chooses 10 and is protected as long as two of them are honest. For large elections it is possible to construct hierarchical counting schemes.

The present invention provides a new tool: families of partially compatible homomorphic encryption functions. There are well known encryption functions with additive ($E(x + y) = E(x)E(y)$) or multiplicative ($E(xy) = E(x)E(y)$) homomorphisms. These properties can be exploited to make very efficient zero-knowledge proofs, but they can also work against security. For example, suppose that one has $E(x)$ and $E(y)$ and wishes to know whether $x + y$ is 1 or -1. If E is a function (as opposed to a probabilistic encryption) with an additive homomorphism then one can compute $E(x + y)$ and check if it is equal to $E(1)$ or $E(-1)$.

Benaloh and Yung in their article entitled "Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters" in ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, 1986, pages 52 to 62, circumvent this difficulty by using a family of probabilistic encryption functions, $\{E_1, \dots, E_r\}$. Each E_i probabilistically encrypts an element $x \in Z_n$, where r is a moderately large prime independent of i . While each E_i satisfies $E_i(x + y) = E_i(x)E_i(y)$, there is no obvious way of combining $E_i(x)$ and $E_i(y)$ to obtain an encryption of some simple function of x and y . A key requirement of their technique was that the encryptions E_i be probabilistic, a condition weakened in the formalism below.

The present invention considers a family of additive homomorphic, possibly deterministic encryption functions, $\{E_1, \dots, E_n\}$. Within this family there is a single group Z_q (where q is large) such that $E_i(x + y) = E_i(x)E_i(y)$, where $x, y \in Z_q$. Thus, they are all basically compatible. However, it is required that for all (i, j) the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:

1. $(E_i(x), E_j(y))$, where x and y are chosen uniformly from Z_q , and
2. $(E_i(x), E_j(x))$, where x is chosen uniformly from Z_q

This implies that for any v , $(E_i(x), E_j(v-x))$ is indistinguishable from $(E_i(x), E_j(v))$.

Thus, if x and y are chosen uniformly such that $x + y = v$, then knowing $(E_i(x), E_j(y))$ does not reveal anything about v . Similarly, if x_1, \dots, x_n are chosen uniformly to sum to v , then knowing $n-2$ of the values $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ reveals nothing about v .

Such families of called encryption functions with this property partially compatible homomorphic encryption functions. Reduction of the existence of such families to any well-known algebraic assumption is unknown. However, there

are a number of candidates for such a family of encryption functions. For example, let primes $p_i = k_i q + 1$, where q is a prime, let g_i be a randomly (or pseudorandomly) chosen generator for

$$\mathbb{Z}_{p_i}^*$$

5

and let

$$\alpha_i = g_i^{k_i}$$

10

If $E_i(x) = \alpha_i^x$, then there is no way of obtaining any information about $x_1 + x_2$ given $E_1(x_1)$ and $E_2(x_2)$ without computing discrete logarithms. The only weakness of the method is that if $p_1 = p_2$ and ℓ is such that $\alpha_2 = \alpha_1$ is known, then one can compute $E_1(x_1 + x_2)^\ell = E_1(x_1)^\ell E_2(x_2)$, which allows one to determine if $x_1 + x_2$ is equal to a given number. No such attack is known when $p_1 \neq p_2$.

15

It is also possible to incorporate encryption functions based on elliptic curves or other groups. Furthermore, it is possible to mix arbitrarily which types of groups are used. For ease of description, multiplicative notation for the cyclic group generated by α_i will be used, regardless if the group is normally treated as multiplicative or additive.

Using these families of partially compatible homomorphic encryption functions, very efficient interactive proofs for assertions are constructed such as:

20

$x_1 + \dots + x_n = a + b$, given the encryptions for these values, and
 $x + y \in \{1, -1\}$, given the encryptions for x and y .

Because of the efficiency of these proofs, it can be run many times, and used with the heuristic of Fiat-Shamir described in an article entitled "How to Prove Yourself: Practical solution to identification and signature problems" in Advances in Cryptology- Crypto '86, Springer-Verlag, 1986, pp. 186 to 199 to make them noninteractive.

25

The improved proof methods bring the complexity of the number-theoretic techniques to the point where they can be used by a personal computer (PC) that can post messages to a bulletin board as will be described below. However, when very strong confidence parameters are used (2^{-40} or even 2^{-60}) error rates are recommended when using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic) and the voter is allowed to protect the vote by using many (e.g., 10) of the available centers, the costs are at the outer margin of usability. Hence, the invention develops methods for making these burdens easier to bear.

30

By allowing nearly all of the work to be done in advance of any election, the computational and communication burden can be amortized over a much larger period of time and still result in having very fast elections. To lower the computational burden of a proof, table lookup techniques are used to reduce the number of group operations required. Finally, a voter can process many votes using much less communication and computation than would be required to process the votes individually.

35

The use of amortization in cryptography is not new. Kurosawa and Tsujii in an article entitled "Multi-language Zero Language Interactive Proof Systems" in Advances in Cryptology-Crypto '90 (1990) pp. 339 to 352, construct a zero-knowledge proof for two assertions that is more efficient than simply concatenating the zero-knowledge proofs for each assertion. Boyar, Brassard and Peralta in an article entitled "Subquadratic Zero-Knowledge" in FOCS 91 (1991) pages 69 to 78, and Kilian in an article entitled "A Note on Efficient Zero-knowledge Proofs and Arguments" in STOC92 (1992) pages 722 to 732, consider the problem of achieving ultra-high confidence zero-knowledge proofs for NP using less communication than is required by simple sequential repetition. Franklin and Yung in an article entitled "Communication Complexity of Secure Computation" in STOC92 (1992) pages 699 to 710, show how to implement k instances of a secure multi-party computation much less expensively than k times the cost of a single secure computation.

40

The present invention therefore provides a method and apparatus for secure electronic voting using partially compatible homomorphisms which is more efficient than the heretofore known methods.

The invention will be more clearly understood when the following description is read in conjunction with the accompanying drawing.

50

Figure 1 is an algorithm useful for proving the validity for shares;

Figure 2 is an algorithm useful for proving summation assertions;

Figure 3 is an algorithm of the electronic scheme comprising the present invention;

Figure 4 is a schematic illustration of a preferred embodiment for practicing the invention;

Figure 5 is a schematic illustration of a vote constructor;

Figure 6 is a schematic illustration of a vote inverter;

Figure 7 is a schematic illustration of a ballot checker;

Figure 8 is a schematic illustration of a multiple-vote constructor;

Figure 9 is a schematic illustration of a multiple-vote ballot checker; and

Figure 10 illustrates the voting process in Figure 3.

The basic voting scheme comprising the present invention will now be described. For simplicity, assume that there are only two centers counting the votes, and that a single yes/no vote is being held. It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that the invention is applicable to situations with many, for example tens, vote counting centers. The basic method does not protect privacy of a vote against the center. This problem will be overcome as described below when more than two centers are involved.

5 The two centers are denoted by C_1 and C_2 . Each vote v will be broken into shares x_1 and x_2 , where x_i is a member of Z_q , and q is a prime. Before being posted, each share x_i is encrypted using encryption function E_i , where $\{E_1, E_2\}$ form a family of partially compatible homomorphic encryption functions.

10 As part of the setup process, which need only be done once for all time, the parties agree on $\{E_1, E_2\}$. Note that with implementations based on discrete-log functions, there is no trapdoor information that need be kept hidden. Thus, for example, a few bits from some global source can be fed into a pseudorandom bit generator and these random bits could be used to choose the moduli and generators needed to specify the desired functions. Heuristically, anyone can provide the seed to the pseudorandom generator, and it is unlikely that the seed will make the output a weak set of functions.

15 Along with setting up the family of encryption functions, assume that basic primitives such as public-key cryptography and secure bit-string commitment have already been established. Let $H(x)$ denote a possibly probabilistic hash function that commits the sender to x without giving away any useful information about x .

The basic election procedure is performed in three stages: vote preparation, vote casting and vote counting.

20 Each voter i chooses a vote v_i , 1 for a yes-vote and -1 for a no-vote. The voter uniformly generates $x_i^{(1)}$ and $x_i^{(2)}$ such that

$$x_i^{(1)} + x_i^{(2)} = v_i \bmod q.$$

The voter then posts

25 $E_1(x_i^{(1)}) = \alpha_1^{x_i^{(1)}}$

and

30 $E_2(x_i^{(2)}) = \alpha_2^{x_i^{(2)}}$

and proves $x_i^{(1)} + x_i^{(2)} \in \{1, -1\}$ without disclosing $x_i^{(1)}, x_i^{(2)}$ nor v_i .

Each voter i encrypts $x_i^{(1)}$ and $x_i^{(2)}$ using the public keys of C_1 and C_2 respectively. Each center j computes $E_j(x_i^{(j)})$ and checks that it agrees with the previously posted value.

35 Each center j sums up $x_i^{(j)}$ modulo q for all voters i and posts sub-tally, t_j . Each voter verifies that

$$E_j(t_j) = \prod_i E_j(x_i^{(j)}).$$

and computes $T = t_1 + t_2$, which is equal to the number of "yes" votes minus the number of "no" votes.

40 Referring to Figure 1 there is shown a simple algorithm, referred to as prove±1, for proving validity of shares, namely that $x_1 + x_2 \in \{1, -1\} \bmod q$ given $E_1(x_1)$ and $E_2(x_2)$. The algorithm is a method by which a verifier proves that when the halves of the votes are combined, the result is a well-formed vote. No information regarding the actual vote is revealed by the method.

45 Each execution of the algorithm in Figure 1 will catch a cheating prover with probability $1/2$. Note that the distribution of (Y_1, Y_2) is easy to simulate given $(E_1(x_1), E_2(x_2))$. Indeed, if R is a perfect zero-knowledge bit commitment then the algorithm is perfect zero-knowledge. Also note that a conceptually more simple algorithm would have the prover reveal $s(x_2 - t)$ in Step 2b. The selected algorithm was chosen for its reduced communication complexity. Both s and t could also be eliminated by having the verifier check both possibilities, but this would save only 2 bits.

50 While this algorithm is given in terms of a verifier, a more round efficient solution is to use the Fiat-Shamir method of eliminating interaction. First, the protocol is run many times (on the order of 40 or 60) in order to make the probability of withstanding all of the challenges vanishingly small. Then the verifier is replaced by a suitably "random looking" hash function which generates the challenges from the prover's posting in Step 1 of the protocol. If the prover is trying to prove an incorrect statement, then heuristically the prover's only strategy is to run different postings through the hash function until finding one whose challenges the prover can meet. However, the cost of this attack is prohibitive if the error probability is truly small (2^{-40} or 2^{-60}).

55 In the basic method described above, there were only two centers and a single yes-no vote. However, in more practical scenarios a voter will want to divide the vote among as many centers as possible - the more centers the more private the vote. Also, a voter is likely to participate in many elections and a given election is likely to have many yes/no votes. For example, Benaloh supra points out that approval voting (where a voter may cast a vote for any number of the

given candidates) is really just a case of several independent yes/no votes. The following describes how to split many votes over many centers with substantial amortized savings compared with preparing each vote separately.

For simplicity, assume that there are only n centers and that each voter will split their votes over all n centers. For each center i there is an encryption function E_i from this family. Following the basic scheme, the voter breaks the vote $v \in \{1, -1\}$ into shares $X_1^{(1)}, \dots, X_n^{(n)}$ such that $v = X_1^{(1)} + \dots + X_n^{(n)}$, and then proves that these shares are correctly constructed. The most straightforward solution is to adapt the algorithm prove±1 shown in Figure 1 to handle more than two shares. Instead, the proof is broken into two stages. First, the prover randomly generates a, b such that $v = a + b$ and proves that $X_1^{(1)} + \dots + X_n^{(n)} = A + B$. Then, the algorithm prove±1 in Figure 1 is used to prove that $v = a + b$. This provides an opportunity to handle multiple votes efficiently as described below.

Figure 2 is an algorithm, referred to as prove-sum, for reducing a sum of n encrypted shares to a sum of two shares. The voter has broken the vote into many encrypted shares and also split the vote into two encrypted halves. The prove-sum algorithm is a method by which a verifier proves that the many shares combine to give the same value as the two halves. No information regarding the actual vote is revealed by the method. The algorithm prove-sum is used in conjunction with the algorithm prove±1 to efficiently show that vote which has been broken into many shares can be combined into a well-formed vote.

Assume that the encryptions $E(X^{(i)})$, $E_a(A)$ and $E_b(B)$ are known, and that

$$(E_1, \dots, E_n, E_a, E_b)$$

is a family of partially compatible homomorphic encryptions with domain Z_q . If the summation assertion is not true, then in each iteration of the protocol the prover will fail a check with probability at least $1/2$. As before, this error rate is lowered to a very small value by repeated repetition, and then the Fiat-Shamir heuristic is used to make the proof noninteractive.

The bulk of computation and communication required for the full n -party scheme is taken up by the proof of the reduction to the 2-share sum. By combining many of these proofs into a single proof, the voter can efficiently prepare many "yes/no" ballots at once with significant savings in the amortized computation and communication required.

Suppose that the voter wants to prove that the following equations hold.

$$\begin{aligned} X_1^{(1)} + X_1^{(2)} + \dots + X_1^{(n)} &= A_1 + B_1 \\ X_2^{(1)} + X_2^{(2)} + \dots + X_2^{(n)} &= A_2 + B_2 \\ &\vdots \\ X_m^{(1)} + X_m^{(2)} + \dots + X_m^{(n)} &= A_m + B_m \end{aligned}$$

and the values of $E(X_j^{(i)})$, $E_a(A_j)$ and $E_b(B_j)$ are known for $1 \leq i \leq n$ and $1 \leq j \leq m$. Let coefficients $c_1, \dots, c_m \in Z_q$ be chosen at random, and consider the following linear equation:

$$X^{(1)} + X^{(2)} + \dots + X^{(n)} = \bar{A} + \bar{B}, \quad (1)$$

where

$$X^{(i)} = \sum_{j=1}^m c_j X_j^{(i)}$$

$$\bar{A} = \sum_{j=1}^m c_j A_j \text{ and}$$

$$\bar{B} = \sum_{j=1}^m c_j B_j$$

By a simple probability argument, the following facts hold:

1. If all of the original linear equations were true, then the new linear equation will also be true, and

2. If at least one of the original linear equations is false, then the new linear equation will be false with probability $1 - 1/q$.

5 Thus, a proof of the new equation will suffice as a proof of all of the original equations.
It remains to show how to generate the encryptions for the new variables and how to choose the coefficients. The
encryptions are given by

$$10 \quad E_i(\bar{X}^{(i)}) = \prod_{j=1}^m E_i(X_j^{(i)})^{c_j}$$

$$15 \quad E_a(\bar{A}) = \prod_{j=1}^m E_a(A_j)^{c_j} \text{ and} \\ E_b(\bar{B}) = \prod_{j=1}^m E_b(B_j)^{c_j}.$$

20 One can view the c_j coefficients as challenges. As before, the Fiat-Shamir scheme is used to generate the value c_j
by a hash function of the original encryptions. Note that in this case, it is not necessary to perform the operation multiple
times, since for a random setting of the coefficients an error in the original set of equations will result in an error in the
final equation with all but vanishing probability. Indeed, for computational efficiency it suffices to choose c_j from $\{1, \dots, 260\}$,
which will greatly speed up the exponentiations.

25 Figure 3 is an algorithm of the election method comprising the present invention as described above for the case
of m votes distributed over n centers. In the precomputation stage, randomly generated votes are broken into encrypted
shares. In the vote-casting stage, the voters specify whether the random vote should be counted as given or be inverted,
i.e. changed from a yes (1) to a no (-1) or vice-versa. In the vote counting stage, the voting centers count their shares
of the vote and post the subtotals. The subtotals do not provide any information for any subset of the voters. The
subtotals are then combined together to determine the final vote. At each step of the algorithm, information is provided
30 to allow voters and (possibly future) outside observers to verify the correctness of each step.

An estimate of the communication cost of the present invention will be calculated. While it will be apparent to those
skilled in the art that there are many possible variations of the present invention, a good understanding of their complexity
can be had by analyzing the cost of splitting a vote into encrypted shares and proving that the shares are well formed.

35 A number of security parameters are involved in this analysis. First, assume that the encryption functions are based
on modular exponentiation over

$$Z_{p_i}^*$$

40 and let k be an upper bound on the length of p_i (if different moduli are used, then they will not be exactly the same size).
Let h be the output of the hash function H used for commitments and let l be the security parameter that effectively
denotes how many times the proofs are run.

45 Consider the most general case of splitting m votes to n centers. Note that for m large, a higher amortized efficiency
is achieved due to the method used. Not counting the cost of the proof, representing these pieces along with the additional
2 shares used in the reduction requires $(n + 2)km$ bits. The cost of proving the correctness of the combined equation
[$2(n + 2)k + (n + 1)h$] bits. At this point, the voter has proved that each set of n shares representing a vote is equal to
the two auxiliary shares. The proof that the two auxiliary shares sum to 1 or -1 costs $[3k + h]m$ bits. The cost of revealing
these shares to the proper counting authorities is approximately nkm bits. Altogether, this gives a total of
50 $2(n + 1)mk + [(2n + 2)k + (n + 1)h + (3k + h)m]l$ bits. Some of the resulting numbers are shown in Table 1. If "center
doubling" is used so as to require only one good center instead of two, then the costs are all doubled.

	1 vote, $l = 40$	1 vote, $l = 20$	100 votes, $l = 40$
Proposed Scheme	56K bytes 2.5 min.	28K bytes 1.5 min	1M bytes 58 min.
Benaloh & Yung (1000 voters)	4M bytes 11 min	1M bytes 3 min	400M bytes 19 hrs

10 All with $n = 10$ centers.

15 Table 1

An approximate estimate computation cost for the voters is described below. In accordance with the invention, the costly computations are mainly modular multiplication and modular exponentiation. Note that many modular exponentiations with the same base are being performed. This fact can be exploited by computing lookup tables that will reduce the number of multiplications required by the exponentiations. For example, it is possible to precompute α^i for all i 's that are powers of 2. This will reduce the average number of multiplications needed to compute $\alpha_x \bmod p$ from $\frac{3}{2}k$ to $\frac{1}{2}k$, requiring a table size of $(n+2)k^2$ bits. Using a more sophisticated table can result in further factor of 3 for the typical number ranges.

Again consider the case of splitting m votes into n shares each. Splitting m votes to mn pieces requires $\frac{1}{2}(n+2)km$ multiplications. A total of $\frac{1}{2}(n+2)kl$ multiplications are needed for proving the reduction to the reduced 2-share representation of a vote. A product of klm multiplications are needed to complete the proof that the votes are well formed. Verifying the subtotals of each center requires $(\frac{1}{2}k + [\# \text{ of voters}])nm$ modular multiplications.

Altogether, the method requires approximately

$$30 \quad \frac{1}{2}[(2n+2+2l)m + (n+2)lk + [\# \text{ of voters}]nm]$$

modular multiplications. A PC running at 33MHz can execute 768 multiplications in a second. Based on this, some of the resulting numbers are shown in Table 1.

Note that these figures are only approximate. However, the cost of the other modular addition or such operations as computing hash functions is comparatively negligible.

An approximate estimate of the computation cost needed for verification will now be described. Again, k is the length of p , and l is a security parameter which determines maximum probability of cheating. The value c is the length of coefficients used in the method which can be set small. Also, modular exponentiation can exploit the previously mentioned table lookup techniques.

Consider the case of splitting m votes into n shares each. The total $\frac{1}{2}(n+2)|c|(m-1)$ multiplications are needed for generating the encryption of the shares, including their representation. The total $\frac{1}{2}(n+2)(k+1)l$ multiplications are needed to verify that the combined equation is correct. The total $(k+1)lm$ multiplications are needed to complete the proofs that the shares are well formed. Altogether, this yields $\frac{1}{2}[(((n+2)|c| + 2)(k+1))m + (n+2)(kl + l - |c|)]$ modular multiplications for each voter.

This number can be reduced by using techniques for verifying many modular exponentiations, resulting in a factor of 4 improvement over actually computing the exponentiations.

The work of Benaloh and Yung gave the first scheme where votes are divided into pieces and the verifiable subtotal yields total outcome of voting. However, their scheme suffers from large communication complexity and seems not yet practical for implementation on existing networks. One of the reasons they need large communication complexity is that each centers generate secret prime factors of their public key N_i . Therefore the scheme involves an interactive protocol to detect possible cheating at the setting of the public keys, together with an interactive protocol to show detected cheat was not due to a malicious voter. Also, since extra information of subtotal may reveal these secret primes, an interactive protocol was necessary to prove the correctness of subtotal. For the above reasons, their protocol needed $(4l^2 + 5l + 2)kn$ bits for communication, where k is the size of the public keys of the n centers, and l is a security parameter.

55 The computation complexity is rather small for each iteration of their scheme, since the computation is based on $y^e x^r \bmod n$ where e and r are much smaller than n . However, since this interactive proof takes place many times, the total cost does not remain so small. An estimate their total computation assuming that they use the same step of constructing a table of $y^r \bmod n$ that requires $n rk$ bits. Then, there will be $3(l^2 + 3l + 1)\lg m + 2(l^2 + l + 1)n + [\# \text{ of voters}]n$

n bit modular multiplication in total, where *k* is the size of public keys of the *n* centers, *r* determines number of voters and *l* is a security parameter. An approximate numerical comparison is shown in Table 1.

Having described the method of practicing the present invention, preferred embodiments useful for practicing the invention will now be described.

5 Figure 4 schematically illustrates a preferred embodiment for practicing the invention. The voters and vote counters use personal computers or workstations 10 connected to a conventional electronic bulletin board 12. All parties (voters, verifiers, counters and the like) to the voting process interact by posting messages to and sending messages from the bulletin board. Voters can also serve as vote counters. The personal computers either contain software to perform the method described above or alternatively contain in hardware or software embodiments of the elements described in Figures 5 to 9.

10 Figure 5 illustrates a vote constructor. The vote constructor 14 generates shares 18 and encrypts the shares 20 for the vote from yes/no vote selection 16 using partially homomorphic encryption functions as described above. The vote constructor also encrypts the shares with the public key of the respective center *C_i* that will process the share. The vote constructor also produces a ballot authentication certificate by which anyone can verify that the encrypted shares combine to make a well-formed vote. The encrypted shares 20 and the certificate 22 are posted to the electronic bulletin board 12. The arrows to centers *C_i* merely specify who is able to decrypt the globally posted information.

15 Figure 6 schematically illustrates a vote inverter for converting "yes" votes to "no" votes and "no" votes to "yes" votes. Given a set of encrypted shares 20, inverter 24 produces a set of encrypted shares 26 for the inverted vote (indicated with the prime), likewise, given all unencrypted share 28, inverter 24 will produce all inverted unencrypted share 30. During the actual voting, the voter specifies whether the previously constructed vote should be inverted before counting or be counted as is. A counter must conform to the specification of the voter or be detected as not conforming to the voter specification by anyone who checks the vote. The inverter enables the preprocessing of a vote, perhaps at the time of registration, and then allows subsequent voting by either confirming the preprocessed vote or inverting the preprocessed vote. This system enables more efficient voting.

20 25 Figure 7 schematically illustrates a ballot checker. The ballot checker 32 receives a set of encrypted shares 20 and the ballot authenticate certificate 22 and determines whether the encrypted shares can be combined to form a well-formed vote, thus indicating a valid or invalid vote.

30 Figure 8 schematically illustrates a multiple-vote constructor. In this case, a multiple yes/no vote selector 40 provides votes to a multiple vote constructor 42. The multiple vote constructor forms shares for each vote and encrypts the shares. Each encrypted vote is in the form of a ballot 44. A single multiple ballot authentication certificate 46 is provided for constructing all of the multiple votes.

35 Figure 9 schematically illustrates a multiple-vote ballot checker. A multiple ballot checker 48 checks a set of votes that were produced by the multiple vote constructor shown in Figure 8. The checker 48 checks that a set of votes were produced by the multiple-vote constructor using the encrypted shares 44 and the single multiple ballot authentication certificate 46. As described in conjunction with the ballot checker in Figure 7, the checker 48 determines whether the shares can be combined to form well-formed votes, thus indicating a valid or invalid vote.

40 Figure 10 graphically illustrates the voting process described in Figure 3. Voter V cast votes "yes" or "no" as shown. The votes are broken into shares, encrypted and split among many centers C. The votes are checked with the certificates to provide proof that the votes were properly encrypted and distributed. The votes and centers verify the election. The centers combine their respective shares to form subtallies which are then combined together to yield the final election result.

Claims

45 1. A method of secure electronic voting with a plurality of voting means and a plurality of vote counting means using partially compatible homomorphisms comprising the steps of:

50 (a) choosing a randomly selected family of partially compatible encryption functions $E_a, E_b\{E_i\}$, for voting means V_1, V_2, \dots, V_n and vote counting means C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n which functions are posted;
(b) each voting means V_k randomly choosing masking votes, $v_{k,j} \in \{1, -1\}$ and then randomly choosing two representations for

$$v_{k,j} \cdot v_{k,j} = X_{k,j}^{(1)} + X_{k,j}^{(2)} + \dots + X_{k,j}^{(n)} = A_{k,j} + B_{k,j}$$

55 and posting $E_i(X_{k,j}^{(1)})$, $E_a(A_{k,j})$ and $E_b(B_{k,j})$;

(c) reducing the equations in step (b) to

$$\bar{x}_k^{(1)} + \bar{x}_k^{(2)} + \dots + \bar{x}_k^{(n)} = \bar{A}_k + \bar{B}_k,$$

5

(d) proving the validity of the equation in step (c) by using prove-sum algorithm;

(e) executing algorithm prove±1, and

(f) encrypting $X_{k,j}^{(i)}$ using C_i 's public encryption algorithm for all j and i and posting the encryptions.

10 2. A method of secure electronic voting as set forth in claim 1, where steps (c), (d) and (e) result in generating an authentication certificate.

3. A method of secure electronic voting as set forth in claim 2, where said generating comprises applying the Fiat-Shamir method.

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4. A method as set forth in any of claims 1 to 3, further comprising the steps of:

(g) voting means k in order to use vote j , computing $s_{k,j} \in \{-1,1\}$ such that an actual vote is equal to $s_{k,j}v_{k,j}$, and posting $s_{k,j}$.

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5. A method as set forth in any of claims 1 to 4, further comprising the steps of:

(h) each vote counting means C_i decrypting $X_{k,j}^{(i)}$ for all k and j , and verifying whether it is consistent with $E_i(X_{k,j}^{(i)})$;

(i) each vote counting means C_i calculating subtally

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$$t^{(i)} = \sum_k s_k \cdot X_{k,j}^{(i)}$$

and posting $t^{(i)}$, and

(j) verifying that

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$$\prod_k (E_i(X_{k,j}^{(i)}))^{s_k}$$

is equal to $E_i(t^{(i)})$.

35 6. A method of secure electronic voting as set forth in claim 4 or 5, further comprising the step of posting j .

7. A method as set forth in claim 5 or 6, further comprising the step of combining said subtotals.

8. A method of secure electronic voting with a plurality of voting means and a plurality of vote counting means using 40 partially compatible homomorphisms comprising the steps of:

(a) choosing a randomly selected family of partially compatible encryption functions E_a, E_b, E_i , for voting means V_1, V_2, \dots, V_n and vote counting means C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n which functions are posted;

(b) each voting means V_k randomly choosing a masking vote, $v_{k,j} \in \{1,-1\}$ and then randomly choosing two representations for

$$v_{k,j} \cdot v_{k,j} = X_{k,j}^{(1)} + X_{k,j}^{(2)} + \dots + X_{k,j}^{(n)} = A_{k,j} + B_{k,j};$$

45

(c) voting means k in order to use vote j , computing $s_{k,j} \in \{-1,1\}$ such that an actual vote is equal to $s_{k,j}v_{k,j}$, and posting $s_{k,j}$, and

(d) each vote counting means C_i calculating subtally

$$t^{(i)} = \sum_k s_k \cdot X_{k,j}^{(i)}$$

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and posting $t^{(i)}$.

9. An apparatus for secure electronic voting using partially compatible homomorphisms comprising:

a plurality of voting means and a plurality of vote counting means, each having a randomly selected family of partially compatible encryption functions, E_a, E_b, E_i which are posted on a publicly accessible media;

each voting means randomly choosing masking votes, $v_{k,j} \in \{1,-1\}$ and randomly choosing two representations for

$$v_{k,j} \cdot v_{k,j} = X_{k,j}^{(1)} + X_{k,j}^{(2)} + \dots + X_{k,j}^{(n)} = A_{k,j} + B_{k,j}$$

and posting $E_i(X_{k,j}^{(i)})$, $E_a(A_{k,j})$ and $E_b(B_{k,j})$ on said publicly accessible media;
means for reducing the equations for $v_{k,j}$ to the form

$$\bar{X}_k^{(1)} + \bar{X}_k^{(2)} + \dots + \bar{X}_k^{(n)} = \bar{A}_k + \bar{B}_k;$$

means for proving the validity of $v_{k,j}$ using prove-sum algorithm;

means for executing algorithm prove+1; and

means for encrypting $X_{k,j}^{(i)}$ using said partial encryption function for all j and i and posting the encryptions on said publicly accessible media.

10. An apparatus for secure electronic voting as set forth in claim 9, further comprising:

means for computing $s_{k,j} \in \{1,-1\}$ such that an actual vote is equal to $s_{k,j}v_{k,j}$ and posting $s_{k,j}$ on said publicly accessible media where k is one of said plurality of voting means and j is a vote.

11. An apparatus for secure electronic voting as set forth in claim 10, further comprising:

means associated with each of said vote counting means for decrypting $X_{k,j}^{(i)}$ for all k and j , and verifying whether it is consistent with $E_i(X_{k,j}^{(i)})$;

means associated with each of said vote counting means for calculating a subtotal

$$t^{(i)} = \sum_k s_k \cdot X_{k,j}^{(i)}$$

and posting $t^{(i)}$ on said publicly accessible media; and

means for verifying that

$$\prod_k (E_i(X_k^{(i)}))^{s_k}$$

is equal to $E_i(t^{(i)})$.

35. 12. An apparatus for secure electronic voting as set forth in claim 10 or 11, further comprising means for posting j on said publicly accessible media.

40. 13. An apparatus for secure electronic voting using partially compatible homomorphisms comprising:

a plurality of voting means and a plurality of vote counting means, each having a randomly selected family of partially compatible encryption functions E_a , E_b , E_i which are posted on a publicly accessible media;

each voting means randomly choosing a masking vote, $v_{k,j} \in \{1,-1\}$ and randomly choosing two representations for

$$v_{k,j} \cdot v_{k,j} = X_{k,j}^{(1)} + X_{k,j}^{(2)} + \dots + X_{k,j}^{(n)} = A_{k,j} + B_{k,j}$$

and posting $E_i(X_{k,j}^{(i)})$, $E_a(A_{k,j})$ and $E_b(B_{k,j})$ on said publicly accessible media;

means for computing $s_{k,j} \in \{-1,1\}$ such that an actual vote is equal to $s_{k,j}v_{k,j}$, and posting $s_{k,j}$ on said publicly accessible media, where k is one of said plurality of voting means and j is a vote;

means associated with each of said vote counting means for decrypting $X_{k,j}^{(i)}$ for all k and j , and verifying whether it is consistent with $E_i(X_{k,j}^{(i)})$;

means associated with each of said vote counting means for calculating a subtotal

$$t^{(i)} = \sum_k s_k \cdot X_{k,j}^{(i)}$$

and posting $t^{(i)}$ on said publicly accessible media; and

means for combining said subtotals for determining the outcome of said voting.

14. An apparatus as set forth in any of claims 9 to 13, where said vote counting means and said voting means comprise a personal computer and said publicly accessible media comprises an electronic bulletin board.
- 5 15. An apparatus as set forth in any of claims 9 to 14, further comprising means for generating an authentication certificate.
16. An apparatus as set forth in any of claims 9 to 15, where said means for generating includes means for applying the Fiat-Shamir method.

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prove±1(x1, x2) /* Given E1(x1), E2(x2), prove that
x1 + x2 ∈ {1, -1} mod q */
```

1. The prover uniformly chooses $r \in Z_q$ and $s \in \{1, -1\}$, and computes $R = H(r)$, the secure commitment for r . The prover then computes

$$Y_1 = E_1(s(x_1 + r)) = (E_1(x_1)E_1(r))^s \text{ and}$$

$$Y_2 = E_2(s(x_2 - r)) = (E_2(x_2)E_2(r)^{-1})^s,$$

and posts (Y_1, Y_2, R) .

- 2a. With probability $\frac{1}{2}$, the verifier asks the prover to reveal r and s . The verifier checks that r is consistent with R and that the above identities for Y_1 and Y_2 hold.
- 2b. With probability $\frac{1}{2}$, the verifier asks the prover to reveal $s(x_1 + r)$ and $t = s(x_1 + r) + s(x_2 - r) \in \{1, -1\}$. The verifier then checks that $Y_1 = (E_1(x_1)E_1(r))^s$ and that $Y_2 = E_2(t - s(x_1 + r))$.

Figure 1

```
prove-sum( $X^{(1)}, \dots, X^{(n)}, A, B$ )
/* Given  $E_1(X^{(1)}), \dots, E_n(X^{(n)}), E_a(A), E_b(B)$ , prove that  $X^{(1)} + X^{(2)} + \dots + X^{(n)} = A + B$  */
```

1. For $0 \leq k \leq n$ the prover uniformly chooses $r_i \in Z_q$. The prover computes the commitment $R_i = H(r_i)$ and computes $Y_1, \dots, Y_n, Y_a, Y_b$ by

$$Y_i = E_i(X^{(i)} + r_i) \text{ for } 1 \leq i \leq n,$$

$$Y_a = E_a(A + r_0) \text{ and}$$

$$Y_b = E_b(B + \left(\sum_{i \geq 1} r_i \right) - r_0).$$

The prover posts R_1, \dots, R_n and $Y_1, \dots, Y_n, Y_a, Y_b$.

- 2a. With probability $\frac{1}{2}$, the verifier challenges the prover to reveal r_0, \dots, r_n . The verifier checks that

$$R_i = H(r_i) \text{ for } 1 \leq i \leq n,$$

$$Y_i = E_i(X^{(i)})E_i(r_i) \text{ for } 1 \leq i \leq n,$$

$$Y_a = E_a(A)E_a(r_0), \text{ and}$$

$$Y_b = E_b(B)E_b\left(-r_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n r_i\right).$$

- 2b. With probability $\frac{1}{2}$ the verifier challenges the prover to reveal $(A + r_0), (B - r_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n r_i)$ and $(X^{(i)} + r_i)$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. The verifier checks that

$$Y_i = E_i(X^{(i)} + r_i) \text{ for } 1 \leq i \leq n,$$

$$Y_a = E_a(A + r_0) = \alpha_a^{(A+r_0)} \text{ and}$$

$$Y_b = E_b(B + \left(\sum_{i \geq 1} r_i \right) - r_0) = \alpha_b^{(B + (\sum_{i=1}^n r_i) - r_0)}.$$

Finally, the verifier checks that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n (X^{(i)} + r_i) = (A + r_0) + \left(B - r_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n r_i \right).$$

Figure 2

m votes n centers Election Scheme

Precomputation (In the following description, i ranges over $1, \dots, n$, j ranges over $1, \dots, m$, and k ranges over the indices of all valid voters V_k .)

1. The vote counters, C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n agree on a randomly selected family of partially compatible encryption functions, $E_a, E_b, \{E_i\}$ and post them.
2. Each voter V_k randomly chooses a "masking vote" $v_{k,j} \in \{1, -1\}$ and then randomly chooses two representations for $v_{k,j}$,

$$v_{k,j} = X_{k,j}^{(1)} + X_{k,j}^{(2)} + \dots + X_{k,j}^{(n)} = A_{k,j} + B_{k,j}.$$

The verifier posts $E_i(X_{k,j}^{(i)})$, $E_a(A_{k,j})$ and $E_b(B_{k,j})$.

3. V_k executes the reduction described in conjunction with eq. (1) and obtains a single equation

$$X_k^{(1)} + X_k^{(2)} + \dots + X_k^{(n)} = \bar{A}_k + \bar{B}_k,$$

equality of which implies that the given two representations of masking vote $v_{k,j}$ are equal for all j . V_k then proves the validity of the equation using prove-sum.

4. V_k executes protocol prove±1 to show that $A_{k,j} + B_{k,j} \in \{1, -1\}$ for all j .
5. V_k encrypts $X_{k,j}^{(i)}$ using C_i 's public encryption algorithm, for all j and i , and posts the encryptions.

Vote Casting

1. To use the j th vote, voter k computes $s_{k,j} \in \{-1, 1\}$ such that his actual vote is equal to $s_{k,j}v_{k,j}$, and posts j and $s_{k,j}$. Note that often j is known and thus need not be sent. Assume that the correct j for each voter is known, and henceforth drop j from the notation.

Vote Counting

1. Each center C_i decrypts $X_k^{(i)}$ for all k and j , and verifies whether it is consistent with $E_i(X_k^{(i)})$. The center calculates the subtotal $t^{(i)} = \sum_k s_k \cdot X_k^{(i)}$ and posts $t^{(i)}$.
2. Each person checking the vote verifies that $\prod_k (E_i(X_k^{(i)}))^{s_k}$ is equal to $E_i(t^{(i)})$. If so, they accept $\sum_i t^{(i)}$ as the tally of the vote.

If precomputation is not used, then v_k can be used as the actual vote and s_k is omitted.

Figure 3




Figure 4




Figure 5




Figure 6




Figure 7




Figure 8




Figure 9




Figure 10

(19)



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(54) Method and apparatus for secure electronic voting

(57) A number-theoretic based algorithm provides for secure electronic voting. A voter may cast a votes among n centers in a manner which prevents fraud and authenticates the votes. Preprocessing allows for nearly all of the communication and computation to be performed before any voting takes place. Each center can verify that each vote has been properly counted. The algorithm is based on families of homomorphic encryptions which have a partial compatibility property. The invention can be realized by current-generation PCs with access to an electronic bulletin board.




Figure 3 .

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EUROPEAN SEARCH REPORT

Application Number
EP 95 11 2941

DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT			
Category	Citation of document with indication, where appropriate, of relevant passages	Relevant to claim	CLASSIFICATION OF THE APPLICATION (Int.Cl.6)
P, X	<p>SAKO K ET AL: "SECURE VOTING USING PARTIALLY COMPATIBLE HOMOMORPHISMS" ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY (CRYPTO), SANTA BARBARA, AUG. 21 - 25, 1994, no. CONF. 14, 21 August 1994, pages 411-424, XP000467666 DESMEDT Y G * page 415, last paragraph - page 421 *</p> <p>---</p>	1-16	H04L9/32
D, A	<p>BENALOH & YUNG: "Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters" PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH SYMPOSIUM ON PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING, August 1986, pages 52-62, XP002099136 New York, USA: ACM 1986 * page 55 - page 57 *</p> <p>---</p>	1-16	
A	<p>SAKO K: "Electronic voting scheme allowing open objection to the tally" IEICE TRANSACTIONS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF ELECTRONICS, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SCIENCES, JAN. 1994, JAPAN, vol. E77-A, no. 1, 1 January 1994, pages 24-30, XP000439660 ISSN 0916-8508 * figure 3 *</p> <p>-----</p>	1,8,9,13	<p>TECHNICAL FIELDS SEARCHED (Int.Cl.6)</p> <p>H04L</p>
<p>The present search report has been drawn up for all claims</p>			
Place of search	Date of completion of the search	Examiner	
THE HAGUE	7 April 1999	Zucka, G	
CATEGORY OF CITED DOCUMENTS		<p>T : theory or principle underlying the invention E : earlier patent document, but published on, or after the filing date D : document cited in the application L : document cited for other reasons & : member of the same patent family, corresponding document</p>	
<p>X : particularly relevant if taken alone Y : particularly relevant if combined with another document of the same category A : technological background O : non-written disclosure P : intermediate document</p>			